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People’s Financial Choice Depends
on their Previous Task Success or
Failure
Katarzyna Seks´cin´ska*
Faculty of Psychology, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
Existing knowledge about the impact of the experience prior to financial choices has
been limited almost exclusively to single risky choices. Moreover, the results obtained in
these studies have not been entirely consistent. For example, some studies suggested
that the experience of success makes people more willing to take a risk, while other
studies led to the opposite conclusions. The results of the two experimental studies
presented in this paper provide evidence for the hypothesis that the experience of
success or failure influences people’s financial choices, but the effect of the success
or failure depends on the type of task (financial and non-financial) preceding a financial
decision. The experience of success in financial tasks increased participants’ tendency
to invest and make risky investment choices, while it also made them less prone to
save. On the other hand, the experience of failure heightened the amount of money
that participants decided to save, and lowered their tendency to invest and make risky
investment choices. However, the effects of the experience of success or failure in non-
financial tasks were exactly the opposite. The presented studies indicated the role of
the specific circumstances in which the individual gains the experience as a possible
way to explain the discrepancies in the results of studies on the relationship between
the experience prior to financial choice with a tendency to take risks.
Keywords: experience, success, failure, financial choices, saving, invest, risk-taking
INTRODUCTION
Traditional economic theories describe a decision maker as a rational person whose choices reﬂect
an estimation of relevant probabilities and outcomes. Every decision is aimed at maximizing
expected value or utility (von Neumann andMorgenstern, 1944). Themost important research and
theory that changed the way of thinking about decisionmakers was the prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). Moreover, psychologists emphasize that every decision (including a ﬁnancial
one), when seen in retrospect as good or bad, can aﬀect a person’s mood, self-esteem, and risk
preferences, for instance (e.g., Isen and Simmonds, 1978; Josephs et al., 1992). Thus, every choice
people make builds their experience, which in turn can determine their subsequent decisions.
Experience of Success or Failure and Risky Choices
Recent work has suggested that there is a signiﬁcant relationship between good or bad experiences
and risk preferences. The experience of success leads men to take more risks (Lam and
Ozorio, 2013). Moreover, people who have experienced success are more likely to make risky
choices than those who have experienced failure (Zawadzka and van Buuren, 2010). A study by
Ludvig et al. (2015) showed that evoking memories of wins makes people more prone to risky
choices.
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The relationship between the experience of failure and risk
preferences seems to be diﬀerent. Lam andOzorio (2013) showed
that failure tends to make women take more risks. Other research
indicated that the experience of serious ﬁnancial loss (e.g., as
a result of hyperinﬂation) lowers people’s risk-taking (Klement
and Miranda, 2012). Bad ﬁnancial decisions in business made by
people with little experience lowers their risk-taking self-eﬃcacies
(Forlani, 2013).
The experience of success can raise a person’s self-esteem
and self-aﬃrmation (Josephs et al., 1992). It can make people
feel more competent in the ﬁeld of the task (e.g., Bandura and
Cervone, 1986). They can also become overly optimistic (in the
case of ﬁnancial tasks ignoring the principle of regression to
the mean), more conﬁdent in their predictions, less sensitive
to objective indicators of the situation and more susceptible to
illusions of control (e.g., Bandura and Cervone, 1986). Finally,
after the experience of success in some task people may prefer to
undertake other, similar activities. Failure, however, creates the
opposite eﬀect. Both the experience of success and the experience
of failure can cause mood changes (Isen and Simmonds, 1978).
The experience of success may put people in a good mood, while
the experience of failure during a bad mood that can inﬂuence
their further decisions.
Mood and Risk
Past research has indicated various mechanisms that mediate
the relationship between mood and risk preferences. Mood
maintenance theory states that people who are in a good mood
seek to maintain the status quo, therefore prefer safer alternatives
(Mischel et al., 1973; Isen et al., 1988; Leith and Baumeister, 1996;
Nygren et al., 1996).
Another mechanism is described in the aﬀect infusion model
(AIM) that explains the role of aﬀective states in people’s
judgments and thinking (Forgas, 1995). The model explains
how people select, learn and interpret new information about a
situation and incorporate them into the knowledge they already
have. Under this theory, the more people need to engage in
constructive processing, the more likely that their aﬀective state
will indirectly or directly inﬂuence their judgments (Forgas,
1995). According to the AIM, a good mood makes people
willing to take a risk, if they have experienced positive outcomes
(respectively good mood) from making risky decisions.
Mood congruence hypothesis refers to the inﬂuence of mood
on memory. Under this hypothesis memories associated with
certain emotions can be recalled by similar emotions (Au et al.,
2003). Therefore, people in a good mood recall good rather
than bad memories. But the role of good and bad mood is not
the same. Good mood makes people more prone to recall good
memories and less prone to recall bad memories, bad mood
decreases people’s propensity to recall good memories, but does
not increase their propensity to recall bad memories (Weiss and
Cropanzano, 1996).
Mood has also been shown to aﬀect the type of cognitive
processing strategies utilized. People in a good mood try to
simplify search procedures and prefer a more heuristic path while
processing information (Au et al., 2003) resulting in a variety
of cognitive biases (Wyer et al., 1999). For instance, people in a
good mood rely on stereotypes (Bodenhausen, 1993), use only
a few categories to classify a new object (Isen and Daubman,
1984) and spend less time deciding (Forgas, 1989). People in a
pleasant mood are more optimistic, conﬁdent and aﬀected by
illusions of control (Au et al., 2003). People in a bad mood
process information diﬀerently. They prefer more algorithmic
ways, making decisions with greater accuracy and reduced variety
of biases (Taylor and Brown, 1988; Sinclair and Mark, 1992).
People in a bad mood are also less aﬀected by illusions of
control than people in a good mood (Alloy and Abramson,
1988).
Subjective probability weighting is another factor that can
mediate the relationship between mood and risk taking. People
in a good mood estimate higher probability of positive outcomes
than people in a bad mood. They also assess bad results as
less likely than people in a bad mood (Wright and Bower,
1992). Moreover, research by Nygren et al. (1996) showed that
people in a positive mood underestimate the probabilities of
negative events and overestimate the probabilities of positive
ones.
There are numerous studies that have shown the role of mood
on risk preferences. Some studies indicated that positive mood is
connected with risk avoidance, in accordance with the mood
maintenance hypothesis (Mischel et al., 1973; Isen et al., 1988;
Leith and Baumeister, 1996; Nygren et al., 1996). However, other
studies indicated that a positive mood is connected with risk-
taking (Nygren et al., 1996; Isen, 1997; Mittal and Ross, 1998),
in accordance with the other theories described above. On the
other hand, some prior studies showed that a negative mood
lowers people’s tendency to make risky decisions (Yuen and Lee,
2003), but for example a study conducted by Bruyneel et al.
(2009) showed that a negative mood can sometimes increase the
propensity for risky decisions if the person has enough time to
actively regulate his or her mood before making the decision.
Other research has indicated, moreover, that the eﬀort to reduce
a negative mood can result in risky behaviors (Tice et al., 2001;
Andrade, 2005).
The results of studies on the impact of mood on risky
choices are not consistent. However, an attempt to explain the
discrepancies has already been made. Isen and Geva’s (1987)
studies showed that people in a good mood prefer lower risk
when the loss is meaningful and possibility of loss is high, but
they are prone to take more risk when the consequences of choice
are trivial and the chance of losing is low. According to the
contingent theory of risk – taking (Au et al., 2003), the role of
mood depends on the speciﬁcs of the risk-task. If the task is
well-deﬁned, special skills are not needed to make a good choice
and the probabilities of gain and loss are known, then mood
maintenance is the prime motive for behavior (Au et al., 2003).
Thus, a good mood leads to more risky choices. But, when the
situation is ambitious, not well known, and probabilities of gain
and loss are not given, then the illusion of control, optimism,
overestimation of the probability of success and underestimation
of the probability of failure are crucial in decision-making (Au
et al., 2003). Therefore, in ambitious situations good mood
encourages risk-taking while bad mood makes people more risk–
averse.
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The Present Studies
The experience of success and failure causes mood changes that
may inﬂuence the eﬀects of experience on people’s risky choices.
In the literature one can ﬁnd attempts to explain inconsistencies
in results on mood and risk that indicate the role of the speciﬁcs
of the task that involves a potentially risky choice, including
the level of diﬃculty of the task, familiarity with speciﬁc tasks,
subjective assessment of signiﬁcance of the results, etc. (Isen
and Geva, 1987; Au et al., 2003). All explanations focus on
the speciﬁc characteristics of decisive situation, which does not
seem to fully answer the question about the causes of observed
non-compliance results of the relationship between mood and
risk-taking.
It seems worthwhile paying attention not only to the task
of risky choice, but also for the task in which the experience
of success or failure prior to the decision was gained, which
is a potential source of mood changes. It can be expected that
the experience of success/failure in the task similar to further
decision situations (e.g., experience in a ﬁnancial task prior to
investment decision), can aﬀect the mood of the individual, but
also her or his assessment of own competence, conﬁdence of
predictions and may increase errors associated with assessment
of the decisive situation, e.g., estimation of the probabilities of
a particular results (Bandura and Cervone, 1986; Forlani, 2013).
While the inﬂuence of experience in a situation unrelated to the
further task (e.g., ﬁnancial choice preceded by coloring pictures)
may be diﬀerent. Undoubtedly, it can still aﬀect mood (Isen and
Simmonds, 1978), but probably has a much lower impact on
the assessment of one’s own skills and competence, conﬁdence
of one’s own predictions in a completely diﬀerent context, and
assessment of diﬀerent outcome probabilities.
The starting point for deliberations on consumption and
saving is very often consumption function presented in Keynes
(1936/2014). The amount that households spend on consumption
depends “partly on the amount of its income, partly on other
objective attendant circumstances, and partly on the subjective
needs and the psychological propensities and habits of the
individuals composing it and the principles on which the income
is divided between them (ibidem. Chapt. 8).” Keynes concluded
that real disposable income is the most important determinant
of consumption and saving. He put forward a psychological
law of consumption, according to which, as income increases
consumption increases but not by as much as the increase
in income (ibidem). In other words, marginal propensity to
consume is more than zero but less than one. In Keynes’
theory the average propensity to consume (APC) decreases with
increasing income (ibidem). Thus the greater the disposable
income, the higher the part of the income allocated for savings
should be. The early empirical ﬁndings supported Keynes’
conjectures about consumption (e.g., Hall and Taylor, 1993). But
in the 1940s empirical studies of long-term times series data from
the US economy for the period 1869–1938 by Simon Kuznets
showed that consumption was in fact stable in spite of rising
income and APC was relatively stable over long periods. Further
studies conﬁrmed Kuznets’ ﬁndings (e.g., Snowdown and Vane,
2005). Evidence therefore indicated that there are two diﬀerent
consumption functions: a short term consumption function with
the variable value of the APC and a long-run consumption
function in which the APC was constant regardless of the level of
income. A short term consumption function seemed to conﬁrm
Keynes’ conjectures. According to Keynes’ theory in the short
term people diﬀerently manage a little than a large amount of
disposable money (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1998), therefore in
the current studies I tested ﬁnancial choices in three situations,
where each person has a small, medium and large amount of
disposable money.
Previous studies on the role of the experience of success
or failure have focused on explaining risky decision-making,
though only a few of them have addressed ﬁnancial choices.
Moreover, most of them utilized the gamble task that oﬀered a
50% chance of winning and 50% chance of losing some money,
which is not very similar to people’s every day ﬁnancial choices.
In addition, there was no distinction between the propensity
to invest and risky investment choices in the previous studies.
This distinction seems to be important because people may
want to invest, but safely. In addition, previous studies related
to the ﬁnancial choices concerned only gamble games, lotteries
and risky investment choices. Actual people’s choices, however,
include more categories. In everyday life, people choose between
consumption, saving and investing.
A justiﬁed question in the presented studies is whether the
impact of the experience of success or failure on the ﬁnancial
choices is diﬀerent if the experience comes from speciﬁc tasks
in the context of money, than when it was gained in a non-
speciﬁc task (not associated with money). Moreover, the studies
presented in this paper were intended to complement existing
research on the eﬀects of experience and mood on ﬁnancial
behavior, indicating the impact of these variables on daily
ﬁnancial choices, including propensity to consume, save and
invest and willingness to build risky investment portfolios.
It was hypothesized that experience of success or failure in
prior ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial tasks would inﬂuence people’s
ﬁnancial choices, especially their tendency to consume, save,
invest (Hypothesis 1), and to build risky investment portfolios
(Hypothesis 2). It was also hypothesized that the role of the
experience on ﬁnancial choices may be diﬀerent when it comes
from speciﬁc (ﬁnancial) that non-speciﬁc (non-ﬁnancial) tasks
(Hypothesis 3).
STUDY 1 – HOW THE EXPERIENCE OF
FINANCIAL TASKS AFFECTS FINANCIAL
CHOICES
The main aim of this study was to examine whether and how
the experience of success or failure in prior ﬁnancial tasks
aﬀects peoples’ tendency to consume, save, invest and make risky
investment choices.
Participants
In order to increase the reliability of the study, the chosen
participants were ﬁnancially independent adults with their own
income, therefore having the potential to gain future investing
experience. They were 259 entrepreneurs and sales workers from
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four Polish cities of diﬀerent sizes. The participants’ ages ranged
from 19 to 67 years (mean = 35.18, SD = 10.4), and 79% were
women. The Ethics Board of the Faculty of Psychology at the
University of Warsaw approved the study, which was carried out
in accordance with the Board’s recommendations. At the end of
the study, the participants were fully debriefed.
Method
The study was conducted with three groups: two experimental
and one control. Participants were randomly assigned to each
group, in which neutral ﬁnancial experience (control group,
n = 87) or an experience of ﬁnancial failure (failure group,
n = 86) or success (success group, n = 86) was created. The
participants were shown 10 charts presenting diﬀerent share
pricing, and were asked to choose which one or ones they
believedwould generate the highest proﬁts within half a year. The
participants were informed that charts presented actual historical
data of 10 companies listed on the Warsaw stock exchange.
After the participants had made their choices, the
experimenter told them that he knew more recent prices of
individual stocks and could say what ﬁnancial consequences
the participants’ choices would cause. The participants of the
ﬁrst experimental group (success group) were then told that
their choices were very good and would bring them money; they
therefore experienced success. The participants of the second
group (failure group) were told that their choices were very bad
and would incur a loss, so they experienced failure. The control
group participants did not receive any feedback. The type of
experience (success, failure, control) was a between subjects
IV. The eﬀectiveness of manipulation was measured in the
pilot studies. After completing the task and obtaining feedback,
participants were asked to answer the question: “How do you
rate your present mood?” They rated their mood on a scale 0
(very bad) to 10 (very good). The group that experienced failure
assessed their mood signiﬁcantly lower than the group who
experienced success (N = 72; t[66] = 2.145, p < 0.05, Cohen’s
d = 0.51).
After an experimental manipulation, the participants were
told what consuming, saving, and investing meant in the context
of the study. Consuming meant spending money on hand on
products or services. Saving meant keeping the money in non-
proﬁtable (or almost non-proﬁtable) form, without the risk
of loss, e.g., deposit in a non-interest-bearing bank account.
Investing was deﬁned as allocating funds to ﬁnancial instruments
that can generate proﬁts but with the risk of losses, e.g., allotment
to stocks or mutual funds.
Then participants were asked to make various hypothetical
ﬁnancial decisions. Hypothetical choices could be argued as a
limitation of the present studies. Some decision experiments
showed that real monetary reward are stronger incentives
than nominally equivalent hypothetical reward (Camerer and
Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001). However, studies
directly comparing large real reward with large hypothetical
reward have provided some evidence that the results of
experiments with hypothetical reward validly apply in everyday
life. Kuhberger et al. (2002) showed no diﬀerences in ﬁnancial
choices between participants who imagined a hypothetical
gamble and those gambling for real money. Other researchers
found in their studies that discounting rates for real and
hypothetical reward did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly (Johnson and
Bickel, 2002; Locey et al., 2011).
The ﬁrst task aimed to capture people’s propensity for diﬀerent
ﬁnancial choices indicated by the money amount assigned by
participants to diﬀerent categories (DV). The participants were
asked to distribute a hypothetical amount of money1 between
consumption, savings, and investment (within subjects IV). This
amount was small (500 PLN; ∼135 USD), medium (3000 PLN;
∼800 USD) and large (10,000 PLN; ∼2655 USD). Participants in
all three groups were asked to dispose of all three sums of money
(level of money was a within subjects IV).
Finally, the participants’ propensity to take investment risks
was assessed. All participants were asked to create an investment
portfolio by indicating what percentage of the hypothetical
amount of money (10,000 PLN; ∼2655 USD) they wanted to
allocate to a variety of ﬁnancial market instruments (DV). The
participants could invest their hypothetical money in bonds,
balanced mutual funds (that invest 50% in stock and 50%
in bonds) and stocks (within subjects IV). The participants
had the opportunity to select one or more of the instruments
mentioned above (e.g., they could allocate the entire sum of
money to stocks or divide it between two or more categories of
investment instruments). The objective of this task was to check
the participants’ propensity to invest in bonds, mutual funds
and shares (indicated by the percentage of amount allocated
to these investment instruments). The task was also to check
general riskiness of the created portfolio. The indicator of the
overall riskiness of the created portfolio reﬂected the percentage
of shares (instruments that are aﬀected by signiﬁcant risk of
loss) in the portfolio (DV). The indicator was based on the
formula: 0 × percentage of bond + 0.5 × percentage of
fund + 1 × percentage of the shares (therefore 0 was the lowest
possible value of the indicator, meaning the safest portfolio, and
100 was the highest possible value of the indicator, meaning the
riskiest portfolio).
All the tools used in the study were developed by the author of
this paper, and all were checked in a several previous pilot studies.
Results
Effects of Success or Failure on Propensity to
Consume, Save and Invest
To test the ﬁrst research hypothesis, a 3 (experience: success,
failure, control – between subjects IV) by 3 (amount levels:
small, medium, large – ﬁrst within subjects IV) by 3 (way
of spending money: consumption, savings, and investment –
second within subjects IV) mixed-design analysis of variance
(ANOVA), with amount of money assigned by participants as a
DV, was conducted. A signiﬁcant interaction between experience,
way of spending money and amount levels was obtained
(F[8,1024] = 3.506, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.027). This suggested that
money assigned by the participants to each way of spending
money diﬀered depending on both type of experience and level
1The values of the small, medium and large amounts were established on the basis
of a pilot study.
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of dividedmoney. The interaction between experience and way of
spendingmoneywas also signiﬁcant (F[4,512]= 5.945, p< 0.001,
η2 = 0.044). The amount allocated for consumption in all groups
was similar, but participants in the failure group and the control
group were willing to spend more money on savings than
investment, whereas in the success group the relationship was
reversed.
In order to perform the follow-up tests, the data set was
split according to the levels of the variables involved in the
signiﬁcant interaction between experience, way of spending
money and amount levels. In a ﬁrst step, the set was divided
into the three amount levels (small, medium, large). Three 3
(experience: success, failure, control – between subjects IV) by 3
(way of spending money: consumption, savings, and investment–
within subjects IV) mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted. The
interaction between experience and way of spending money was
signiﬁcant for small (F[4,512] = 2.648, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.020),
medium (F[4,512] = 8.148, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.060) and large
(F[4,512] = 4.267, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.032) money level. The
means (Figure 1) showed that for the small amount, the largest
money was assigned to consumption after neutral experience
(control group) and the smallest after success. A larger amount
was spent on saving if participants experienced failure, while
an amount assigned to invest was larger after success. When
the amount level was medium a higher propensity to consume
was observed after neutral experience. People decided to assign
the highest amount to savings after the experience of failure
and the smallest after success. A higher part of money was
spent on investments if participants were from the success
group. For the large amount level, propensity to consume
was similar for all experience groups. However, the money
assigned to savings was the highest when the failure group
decided and the smallest when participants from the success
group made a decision. For the investments the pattern was the
opposite.
To correctly interpret the obtained interactions and
to check the relationships presented above, the small,
medium, and large amount subsets were divided according
to the three categories of spending money (consumption,
savings, and investment) and ANOVAs were run to
compare each experience category (success, failure, neutral).
The results are listed below, by category of spending
money.
Eﬀects of success or failure on consumption
The results of the ANOVA showed that for the small amount
of money divided, the diﬀerence between the three analyzed
groups in amount spent on consumption was signiﬁcant
(F[2,256] = 3.161, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.024). Furthermore, t-tests
showed that participants from the success group were prone
to spend less money on consumption than the control group
(t[165] = 2.328, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.35). The ANOVA
showed no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the three
conditions for medium (F[2,256] = 1.717, p = 0.18, η2 = 0.013)
and large (F[2,256] = 0.467, p = 0.63, η2 = 0.004) amount
of money divided. The descriptive statistics are presented in
Figure 1.
Eﬀects of success or failure on saving
With a one-way ANOVA, the amount spent on saving for
the success, failure and control groups were compared. The
descriptive statistics are presented in Figure 1. There were no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences observed when the divided amount was
small (F[2,256] = 0.660, p = 0.52, η2 = 0.005). For the medium
amount, ANOVA indicated that the diﬀerence between the
groups was signiﬁcant (F[2,256] = 7.824, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.058),
with the success group’s propensity to save being lower than that
of the control (t[170] = 2.342, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.36) and
failure (t[166] = 4.107, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.62) groups.
Moreover, a signiﬁcant manipulation eﬀect was observed for
the propensity for saving a large amount (F[2,256] = 4.665,
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.035). Further t-tests showed that participants
that experienced failure tended to save more than those from the
success (t[256] = 2.926, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.45) or control
(t[256] = 2.226, p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.34) group.
Eﬀects of success or failure on investing
There were signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the amount assigned to
investments between the experience groups in all three levels of
amount: small 500 PLN– F(2,256)= 5.206, p< 0.001, η2 = 0.039;
medium 3000 PLN –F(2,256) = 10.136, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.073;
large 10 000 PLN – F(2,256) = 4.619, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.035).
The contrast tests showed that the participants from the success
group who were assigned the small and medium amounts were
more prone to invest than those from the failure (small amount:
t[143] = 3.113, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.48; medium amount:
t[165] = 4.009, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.61) and control (small
amount: t[170] = 2.289, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.35; medium
amount: t[170] = 3.383, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.54) groups.
Furthermore, the amount spent on investment was higher in the
success group than in the failure group, when the large amount of
money was divided (t[256] = 3.035, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.48).
The mean values are presented in Figure 1.
Effects of Success or Failure on Risky Investment
Choices
To verify the second research hypothesis anANOVA test revealed
diﬀerences between the three experimental groups (success,
failure, control) in terms of the risk level of the created investment
portfolios (F[2,256]= 4.967, p< 0.05, η2 = 0.037). Themeans for
each group were: success group = 48.61, failure group = 35.87,
control group = 38.38. Further analysis showed that the success
group built riskier portfolios than both failure (t[256] = 2.945,
p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.44) and control (t[256] = 2.472, p< 0.05,
Cohen’s d = 0.37) groups.
Further analysis aimed to check whether the experimental
groups diﬀered in the money assigned to diﬀerent forms of
investments: bonds, shares, and mutual funds. A 3 (experience:
success, failure, control – between subjects IV) by 3 (form of
investment: bonds, mutual funds, stocks – within subjects IV)
mixed-design ANOVA, with a percentage of amount of money
assigned by participants as a DV, was conducted. A signiﬁcant
interaction between experience and form of investment was
obtained (F[4,512] = 3.573, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.027). Further
ANOVA analysis showed that there were signiﬁcant diﬀerences
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FIGURE 1 | Money assigned to consumption, saving, and investing by each experience group for different amount levels (Mean amount in PLN) –
Study 1.
between the groups in terms of their tendency to invest in
bonds (F[2,256] = 3.413, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.029) and shares
(F[2,256] = 6.555, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.049). There were no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences observed in the amount of money spent
on mutual funds (F[2,256] = 1.287, p = 0.28, η2 = 0.010).
Further t-tests revealed that the success group allocated less
money to bonds than the failure group (t[256] = 2.280, p< 0.05,
Cohen’s d = 0.35), and more money to stocks than both the
failure (t[256] = 3.187, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.47) and control
(t[256] = 2.953, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.44) groups. The
descriptive statistics for each of the groups analyzed are presented
in Figure 2.
STUDY 2 – HOW THE EXPERIENCE OF
NON-FINANCIAL TASKS AFFECTS
FINANCIAL CHOICES
The goal of the next study was to examine whether the inﬂuence
of failure or success on ﬁnancial risk observed in the ﬁrst
experiment would only apply to ﬁnancial failure or success, or
if the phenomenon is of a more general nature. Therefore, Study
2 involved observing whether failure or success in non-ﬁnancial
tasks could have the same eﬀect on ﬁnancial choices.
Participants
Analogously to Study 1, in order to increase the reliability of the
study, the participants in Study 2 were ﬁnancially independent
adults with their own income and the potential to have experience
investing money. They were entrepreneurs and sale workers
recruited from four Polish cities of diﬀerent sizes, and aged 18 to
68 years (mean = 36.52, SD = 11.8). Of the 271 participants, 75%
were women. All the participants gave their informed consent in
accordance with the APA Ethical Principles of Psychologists and
Code of Conduct. The Ethics Board of the Faculty of Psychology
at the University of Warsaw approved the study. The participants
were fully debriefed at the end of the study.
FIGURE 2 | Percentage of money assigned to invest in different forms
of instruments in success, failure, and control groups – Study 1.
Method
Study 2 also involved three groups—two experimental and one
control—to which participants were randomly assigned (success
group n = 90, failure group n = 90, control group n = 91). The
participants were shown a board of 24 squares, each with the
same pattern of ﬁve dots (Supplementary Figure S1). They were
asked to draw a line connecting at least two dots in each square,
each in a unique way. The participants had 30 s to complete the
task. The participants of the ﬁrst experimental group (success
group) were informed that they had done the task well; i.e.,
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they experienced success. The participants of the second group
(failure group) were told that they had done the task poorly: they
experienced failure. The participants of the control group did
not receive any feedback. The eﬀectiveness of manipulation was
measured in the pilot studies in the same way as the manipulation
in the ﬁrst study. The group that experienced failure assessed their
mood signiﬁcantly lower than the group who experienced success
(N = 70; t[66] = 3.316, p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.79).
Then the participants answered a few questions (the same as
the ones used in Study 1) about various hypothetical ﬁnancial
decisions. First, all participants were asked to divide a small
(500 PLN; ∼135 USD), medium (3000 PLN; ∼800 USD) and
large (10,000 PLN; ∼2665 USD) amount of money between
consumption, saving, and investment to verify the participants’
propensity to consume, save and invest. In order to check their
propensity for investment risk, they were asked to create an
investment portfolio by indicating the percentage of the sum that
they wanted to spend on bonds, mutual funds, and stocks. The
participants had the opportunity to select any number of the
instruments mentioned.
The measured variables in Study 2 were the same as Study
1: between subjects IV: experience (success, failure, control);
within subjects IVs: level of amount (small, medium, large), way
of spending money (consumption, saving, investing), form of
investment (bonds, mutual funds, stocks); DVs: money assigned
by participants, percentage of money assigned by participants.
Results
Effects of Success or Failure on Propensity to
Consume, Save and Invest
To test the ﬁrst research hypothesis in a context of experience in
a non-ﬁnancial task, a 3 (experience: success, failure, neutral) by
3 (amount levels: small, medium, large) by 3 (way of spending
money: consumption, savings, and investment) mixed-design
ANOVA, with an amount of money assigned by participants as
a DV, was conducted.
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between experience, way
of spending money and amount levels (F[8,1052] = 2.561,
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.019). This result suggested that money assigned
by the participants to each way of spending money diﬀered
depending on both type of experience and level of divided
money. The signiﬁcant interaction between experience and way
of spendingmoney was also obtained (F[4,526]= 3.598, p< 0.05,
η2 = 0.027). On the basis of the means it may be noted that in all
groups the amount allocated for consumption was the smallest
and for investment the largest. But the ratio of the amount
allocated to the various categories of way of spending money
diﬀered between experience groups.
For further analysis, the data set was split according to the
levels of the variables involved in the signiﬁcant interaction
between experience, way of spending money and amount levels.
In a ﬁrst step, the set was divided into the three amount levels
subsets (small, medium, large). Three 3 (experience: success,
failure, neutral – between subjects IV) by 3 (way of spending
money: consumption, savings, and investment–within subjects
IV) mixed-design ANOVAs were conducted. The interaction
between experience and way of spending money was signiﬁcant
for all levels of money: small (F[4,530] = 3.011, p < 0.05,
η2 = 0.020), medium (F[4,530] = 3.016, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.022)
and large (F[4,528] = 3.030, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.022) money level.
Based on means (Figure 3) the small level of amount of money
assigned to consumption was larger for the success group than
others, money spent on savings were the biggest for the success
group and the smallest for the failure group. For the investments
the ﬁndings were exactly the opposite. When the level of amount
was medium, money assigned to consumption was similar for
all experience groups. Participants who experienced failure spent
less money on savings than others. People were prone to spend
the largest amount of money if they experienced failure and the
smallest amount after success experience. Finally, for the large
level of amount, a higher amount of money was assigned to
consumption by participants that experienced success. People
were prone to assign the highest amount of money on savings
after the experience of success and the lowest amount after the
failure. For the money allocated to investments the ﬁndings were
the opposite.
In order to correctly interpret the obtained interactions
and verify the signiﬁcance of diﬀerences in means presented
above and, the small, medium and large amount subsets were
divided according to the three categories of spending money
(consumption, savings, and investment) and ANOVAs were run
to compare each experience category (success, failure, neutral).
The analyses are listed below, by category of spending money.
Eﬀects of success or failure on consumption
A one-way ANOVAwas used to examine the diﬀerences between
the three experience groups in the amount of money assigned to
consumption (means are presented in Figure 3). No signiﬁcant
diﬀerences were observed when people were asked to divide the
small (F[2,269] = 0.997, p = 0.37, η2 = 0.007) and medium
(F[2,269] = 0.120, p = 0.88, η2 = 0.001) amounts of money.
However, the ANOVA test indicated diﬀerences between the
groups when distributing the large amount (F[2,264] = 2.528,
p < 0.005, η2 = 0.019). Further t-tests showed that the success
group tended to spend more money on consumption than the
control group (t[264] = 2.205, p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.32).
Eﬀects of success or failure on saving
An ANOVA test showed no diﬀerence between the groups in
terms of the sum of money they assigned to savings when the
level of divided amount was small (F[2,269] = 1.431, p = 0.24,
η2 = 0.011) or large (F[2,269] = 2.240, p = 0.11, η2 = 0.017).
Signiﬁcant diﬀerences were observed only when participants
were asked to dispose a medium amount (F[2,265] = 3.297,
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.024). Further analysis showed that the failure
group was prone to save less money than the other experience
groups (success vs. failure: t[264] = 2.005, p < 0.05, Cohen’s
d = 0.36; success vs. control: t[264] = 2.373, p < 0.05, Cohen’s
d = 0.34).
Eﬀects of success or failure on investing
The eﬀects of the experience of success or failure on people’s
propensity to invest were analyzed using an ANOVA test; the
mean values for the experimental groups are presented in
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FIGURE 3 | Money assigned to consumption, saving and investing by each experience group for different amount levels (Mean amount in PLN) –
Study 2.
Figure 3. The results showed statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between three experience groups (success, failure and control) in
the sums spent on investments for the small (F[2,266] = 3.495,
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.026), medium (F[2,265] = 3.401, p < 0.05,
η2 = 0.025) and large (F[2,264] = 3.857, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.028)
amount levels. Further analysis indicated that the success group
was prone to invest less money than the failure group regardless
of the amount (small: t[168] = 2.584, p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.31,
medium: t[265] = 2.481, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.36 and large:
t[264] = 2.642, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.39) and less money than
the control group when the amount was small (t[172] = 2.090,
p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.38) or large (t[264] = 2.090, p < 0.05,
Cohen’s d = 0.31). The control group, on the other hand, invested
a smaller portion of the medium amount than the failure group
(t[264] = 2.004, p< 0.05, Cohen’s d = 0.30).
Effects of Success or Failure on Risky Investment
Choices
One-way ANOVA was used to examine the diﬀerences between
all experience groups (success, failure, control) in terms of the
risk level of the created investment portfolios. The means for
each group were: success group = 34.28, failure group = 42.36,
control group= 41.45. The riskiness of the investment portfolios,
expressed as a total percentage of stocks in portfolio, diﬀered
signiﬁcantly between the groups (F[2,261] = 3.388, p < 0.05,
η2 = 0.158). Contrast tests showed that the success group created
safer portfolios than both the failure (t[261] = 2.222, p < 0.05,
Cohen’s d = 0.35) and control (t [261] = 2.005, p< 0.05, Cohen’s
d = 0.30) groups.
To further verify the second research hypothesis, a 3
(experience: success, failure, control – between subjects IV)
by 3 (form of investment: bonds, mutual funds, stocks –
within subjects IV) mixed-design ANOVA, with a percentage
of amount of money assigned by participants as a DV, was
conducted. A signiﬁcant interaction between experience and
form of investment was obtained (F[4,522] = 2.643, p < 0.05,
η2 = 0.020). Furthermore, the next ANOVA analysis revealed
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between all experimental conditions with
regards to the propensity to invest in bonds (F[2,261] = 3.695,
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.028) and mutual funds (F[2,261] = 3.370,
p < 0.05, η2 = 0.025). The means and standard deviations of
the three groups analyzed are reported in Figure 4. Further
analysis using t-tests showed that participants from the success
group were prone to spend more money on bonds and less on
mutual funds than the failure (bonds: t[261] = 2.400, p < 0.05,
Cohen’s d = 0.41, mutual funds: t[170] = 2.684, p< 0.05, Cohen’s
d = 0.36) and control groups (bonds: t[261] = 2.073, p < 0.05,
Cohen’s d = 0.30, mutual funds: t[161] = 2.040, p< 0.05, Cohen’s
d = 0.31). No diﬀerence was observed between the three groups
in terms of their tendency to invest in stocks (F[2,261] = 2.261,
p = 0.29, η2 = 0.002).
DISCUSSION
The studies presented in this paper sought to examine the eﬀects
that the experience of success or failure in ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial tasks had on ﬁnancial choices, including consumption,
saving, investing and risky investment decisions.
Findings of the described research on consumption showed
lower propensity to consume after a positive ﬁnancial experience
(but only when a small amount was allocated) but higher
propensity to consume after a positive non-speciﬁc experience
(but only when the large amount was allocated). The results
did not show a role of experience of failure in explaining the
propensity to consume and did not indicate any signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in propensity to consume between people who
experienced success and failure. However, there is a possible
explanation for these results. Mick and De Moss (1990)
conducted a survey showing that personal accomplishments
and achieved goals (in other words the experience of success),
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FIGURE 4 | Percentage of money assigned to invest in different forms
of instruments in success, failure, and control groups – Study 2.
are important reasons why people reward themselves. Some
examples of self-reward arematerial goods like sweets, new cloths
or home electronics. KPMG survey in China showed that over
60 percent of participants bought themselves some luxury goods
as a reward for their success (Debnam and Svinos, 2006). On
the other hand, people who experience failure in some task can
feel that their view of themselves is threatened and thus be
motivated to engage in some compensatory behaviors to restore
the status quo (Higgins, 1987). Many previous studies have
indicated that consumption is one of the means willingly chosen
by people to compensate for self-threats (i.e., Lee and Shrum,
2013; Rucker and Galinsky, 2013). These ﬁndings suggest that
both experience of success and experience of failure may increase
people’s propensity to consume which can be the explanation
why there were no diﬀerences between success and failure groups
observed in the current studies. The question is why there was
no eﬀect of failure on consumption and why the role of the
success was inconsistent? Koch et al. (2014) postulated that
diﬀerent goods have a diﬀerent motivational strength for an
individual not only because they diﬀer in terms of prices but
also because they vary in terms of their value to the person.
Compensatory consumption after negative experience aims to
buy products that signal success in the speciﬁc domain of
self-threat (Levav and Zhu, 2009; Lisjak et al., 2015). There
are plenty of studies that conﬁrm this statement in diﬀerent
domains of threat, e.g., intelligence (Kim and Rucker, 2012),
power (Rucker and Galinsky, 2008) or social system (Cutright
et al., 2011). Consumption after the experience of success, as a
self-reward may not be related to the area in which the person
succeeded (Mick and De Moss, 1990). Given these ﬁndings it is
hypothesized that the role of the experience of success and failure
on consumption may be more qualitative than quantitative,
thus it is possible that the stronger eﬀect may appear instead
when we ask about the type of goods people are willing to buy,
not the amount of money they are willing to spend on them.
However, this is only a hypothesis that may be tested in a future
study.
The ﬁndings from the reported studies showed that the
experience of success and failure in a prior task inﬂuenced
people’s propensity to save, invest and risky investment choices.
Study 1 showed that the experience of success in ﬁnancial tasks
lowered the propensity to save and to choose safe investment
instruments, but increased the propensity to invest (especially
in stocks) and to create a risky investment portfolio. The
experience of failure in ﬁnancial tasks signiﬁcantly increased safe
investment preferences and the propensity to save, but lowered
the general tendency to invest, to create a risky investment
portfolio and to invest in stocks. The ﬁndings from Study
2, on the other hand, were exactly the opposite. People who
experienced success in non-ﬁnancial tasks preferred to save
more, invest less, and create safer investment portfolios with
a large amount of bonds. The failure group was less prone
to save and more likely to invest and create risky investment
portfolios. These results support the hypothesis that the role of
the experience on ﬁnancial choices may be diﬀerent when it
comes from speciﬁc (ﬁnancial) than non-speciﬁc (non-ﬁnancial)
task.
The ﬁnancial tasks after the priming of success or failure
were the same in both studies, the only diﬀerence was the
priming task. The experience of success or failure aﬀects
mood, regardless of the kind of task, as noted, for instance,
by Isen and Simmonds (1978). In accordance with the mood
maintenance theory people seek to maintain a good mood;
they therefore do not want to jeopardize it by a potential
loss on an investment (e.g., Leith and Baumeister, 1996).
Consequently, people in a pleasant mood in both studies
should prefer to save rather than invest; if they do invest,
they should prefer safer instruments. Moreover, whatever
the kind of task, the experience of success stimulates self-
aﬃrmation, while the experience of failure threatens self-
esteem (Josephs et al., 1992). People prefer to reinforce their
self-esteem and reduce threats to it (Josephs et al., 1992).
Thus, people in both studies are supposed to prefer safer
ﬁnancial options after success, but may be more prone to
risky investments after failure. These arguments could explain
the results of Study 2 (experience in non-ﬁnancial tasks),
but the ﬁndings from Study 1 indicated the opposite. One
possible explanation is that the experience of success in a
preceding ﬁnancial task (in contrast with experience in a non-
ﬁnancial task) may raise individuals’ belief in their ﬁnancial
self-eﬃcacy. Furthermore, in accordance with the AIM (Forgas,
1995), the experience of success in a ﬁnancial task creates
a very fresh memory of success in a situation related to
investing, that makes people more prone to risky choices.
Prior experience in a ﬁnancial task makes people also more
familiar with the investment situation, so they may become less
risk averse. The important role of familiarity on investment
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decisions was shown for example by Massa and Simonov
(2006). Moreover, the experience of success can increase people’s
tendency to overestimate the probability of success, and foster
over-conﬁdence in their own predictions; it can be expected
that the eﬀect is stronger in the case of experience in the
speciﬁc task (in the context of subsequent decisions) than in
terms of a non-speciﬁc task (e.g., Bandura and Cervone, 1986).
Failure, however, creates the opposite eﬀect. Participants in both
studies were asked to create an investment portfolio, which
is the investment task, for which, in real life, good results
depend on the knowledge and skills of the individual. Thus,
in accordance with previous studies (Au et al., 2003), people
in a good mood are supposed to prefer a rather aggressive
portfolio, while people in a bad mood safer ones. However,
people in the ﬁrst study were asked to make another investment
choice a few minutes earlier (experimental manipulation). They
were asked about stock selection, estimating their future value,
based only on the share price charts. Thus, probably when
decisions were made, participants in study one were more
aware that the choice of ﬁnancial instruments requires a broad
knowledge. These arguments may explain the results obtained
in the ﬁrst study and their discrepancies with the results of
the second study, but further studies are needed to verify those
explanations.
In summary, the results of the reported studies suggest
that the experience of success and failure in the preceding
task aﬀects ﬁnancial choices, especially people’s propensity
to save, invest and create a risky investment portfolio.
Furthermore, how it aﬀects the subsequent choices depends
on whether the experience was in a speciﬁc task (in
the context of ﬁnancial choices) or in a non-speciﬁc
one.
The studies presented in this paper partly ﬁll a gap in
the research on the role of experience in both ﬁnancial
and non-ﬁnancial tasks preceding ﬁnancial choices. Existing
knowledge about the impact of the experience prior to
ﬁnancial choices was limited almost exclusively to individual
risky choices. The reported studies complement the existing
knowledge about the conclusions on the propensity to
consume, save, invest and build risky investment portfolios.
Research in previous studies mentioned the reasons for the
ambiguous impact of experience on the risk preferences
for the type of decisions (e.g., how they were important
for the individual or whether the decision-making situation
was ambitious and required knowledge and skills). The
presented studies showed another way to explain these
discrepancies, indicating the role of the speciﬁc circumstances
in which the individual has experienced success or
failure.
Limitations and Future Studies
The studies have some possible limitations. The ﬁrst is
the methodology of the pilot studies of the experimental
manipulations. The participants’ mood was measured only after
the experience, not both prior and after it. Therefore clear-cut
conclusions cannot be drawn. It would be worth checking mood
changes after the manipulation again, taking into account the two
measurements – before and after the experience.
The second limitation of the studies is the ratio of women to
men among the participants in both studies. In each experimental
condition (success, failure and control group) the ratio of women
to men was the same in all three groups. Previous research has
shown that women are more averse to risk than men (Hartog
et al., 2002; Agnew et al., 2008); it is therefore important to
replicate the studies with the participation of an equal number
of men and women.
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